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The phenomenon of loss aversion (the tendency for losses to have a greater impact than
comparable gains) has long been observed in daily life. Neurocognitive studies and brain
imaging studies have shed light on the correlation between the phenomenon of loss
aversion and the brain region of the prefrontal cortex. Recent brain stimulation studies
using bilateral transcranial magnetic stimulation or transcranial direct current stimulation
(tDCS) have obtained various results showing the causal relationship between brain
regions and decision making. With the goal of studying whether unilateral stimulation
can change participants’ risky decision making in the frames of gains and losses,
we applied different polarities of tDCS over the regions of the right or left prefrontal
cortex. We also designed a risk measurement table (Multiple Price List) to reflect the
participants’ attitudes toward risky decision making via the crossover point including
the frames of gains and losses. The results of our experiment indicated that the
participants tended to be more risk averse in the gain frame after receiving left anodal
tDCS and more risk seeking in the loss frame after receiving right cathodal tDCS,
which was consistent with the hypothesis that the process of risky decision making
was correlated with the interaction of multiple systems in the brain. Our conclusion
revealed an asymmetric effect of right/left DLPFC when the participants faced gains and
losses, which partially provided the neural evidence and a feasible paradigm to help
better understand risky decision making and loss aversion. The current study can not
only expand the traditional understanding of the behavioral preferences of humans in
economics but also accommodate empirical observations of behavioral economists on
the preferences of humans.
Keywords: risk preference, loss aversion, transcranial direct current stimulation, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,
asymmetric effect
INTRODUCTION
To determine how to address the complex problems of daily life, it is necessary to understand
human decision making in the face of risk and uncertainty (Gurevich et al., 2009). For example,
when offered a bet with an equal probability of winning or losing $100, most people would refuse
to participate in the gamble. Behavioral economists and psychologists have demonstrated that a
loss of $X is more aversive than a gain of $X; this phenomenon is called loss aversion and is closely
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related to risky decision making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979,
1984; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Loss aversion also implies
that when facing two options, for example, (A) a probability
of 1.0 to win $3000 or (B) a probability of 0.8 to win $4000,
most participants would choose the former. When faced with a
different set of options, (A) a probability of 1.0 to lose $3000 or
(B) a probability of 0.8 to lose $4000, most participants would
choose the latter (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
In summary, compared with acquiring gains, people always
have a much stronger intention to avoid potential losses,
which is one of the most well-known and earliest reported
anomalies discovered by economists (Tversky and Kahneman,
1981; Kahneman et al., 1990). In the middle of the 20th
century, Markowitz (1952) and Williams (1966) studied this
kind of abnormal behavior of investors in the stock market.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984) studied the phenomenon
of loss aversion and described the process in the framework of
prospect theory: contrary to the traditional utility theory, the
shape of the value function, which can be expressed as v(·), and
the weighting function, which can be expressed as w(·), reflect
the psychophysics of diminishing sensitivity in the theoretical
framework of prospect theory. The value function is concave
for gains but turned to be convex for losses, according to the
theory, which indicates that the marginal impact of a change in
outcome or probability diminishes with the distance from the
relevant reference points (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, 1992). The characteristic of the
value function, with a concave shape for gains and convex for
losses, contributes to the risk aversion for gain but risk seeking
for losses (Boorman and Sallet, 2009).
Evolutionary psychologists regard loss aversion as an instinct
that evolved in humans (Breiter et al., 2001; Kenrick et al., 2009;
De Martino et al., 2010; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2012). Most of the
time, earnings and income would improve the living conditions
of our ancestors, whereas unexpected losses could lead to death.
For example, when crossing a dessert, additional drinking water
would make people more comfortable, but lack of water would
be fatal. In uncertain conditions, there are inevitably asymmetric
expectations associated with gains and losses (McFarlane and
Pliner, 1997). If this evolutionary claim is correct, then loss
aversion is not a process of rational calculation but is more
likely controlled by a neural structure in our brain that evolved
long ago (Wilkinson and Klaes, 2012). Neuroeconomists and
neuropsychologists have suggested that decision making under
uncertainty is not a process of rational calculation based on
the theory of classical economics but, rather, a heuristic process
implemented in a brain region or neural structure to solve these
problems in the face of uncertainty. Our brains and neural
systems may form fixed neural circuits that are stimulated by
survival-related events to ensure efficient decision making under
similar conditions.
Recent neuroimaging studies have suggested that the risky
decision making process of humans largely relies on the function
of different brain regions. Breiter et al. (2001) applied functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and found that the amygdala
and orbital gyrus were activated when the participants were faced
with losses; Knutson et al. (2001) used a monetary incentive
delay task to demonstrate the correlation between risky decision
making and the striatum; Tom et al. (2007) revealed the neural
basis of loss aversion, which attributes the decision process to the
interaction and combination of different brain regions, including
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and the ventral
striatum (VS). Pammi et al. (2015) studied differences in neural
loss aversion between depressed and healthy individuals to find
that the two groups shared a brain network for value function
approximation including the right ventral striatum, VMPFC, and
right amygdala. As one of the most important brain regions in the
cognitive process, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) has
also been proven to be a region relevant to risky decision making.
Mohr et al. (2010) used quantitative meta-analyses to reveal that
the DLPFC was significantly activated in choice situations of risky
decision making. Other evidence also revealed that the superior
frontal gyrus (SFG), which is adjacent to the DLPFC, showed an
increased activation during risky decision making (Engelmann
and Tamir, 2009). All of the fMRI studies allowed researchers
to identify the neural circuitry underlying different but related
cognitive processes. However, non-invasive brain stimulation
is also indispensable for allowing us to better understand the
neurological process of decision making by showing us how the
modulation of a specified brain region can directly impact our
behavior.
Brain stimulation technologies, such as transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) and transcranial direct current stimulation
(tDCS), have been widely used to study the neurological
correlations of risky decision making and the changes in risk
attitudes caused by stimulation in healthy participants (Gandiga
et al., 2006). Compared with neuroimaging studies, brain
stimulation studies are more focused on the cortex. Knoch et al.
(2006) applied TMS to diminish the function of the right DLPFC
of participants and found significant risk-seeking behavior in
decision making in the TMS group. Fecteau et al. (2007a)
showed that participants receiving right anodal/left cathodal
tDCS adopted a risk-averse response style. Fecteau et al. (2007b)
also indicated that simultaneous tDCS stimulation over the right
and left DLPFC led participants to become much more risk averse
than those with unilateral or sham stimulation. Boggio et al.
(2010) found that after receiving left anodal/right cathodal tDCS,
the older participants tended to choose the high-risk prospect
more often than after receiving other kinds of stimulation.
Weber et al. (2014) found that enhancing the activity of either
the right or left DLPFC using tDCS did not change the risk
attitudes of participants. Ye et al. (2015b) demonstrated that right
anodal/left cathodal stimulation over the DLPFC caused risk-
seeking behavior in situations of gains but risk-averse behavior
in losses.
These varying results may be attributed to the use of different
stimulation modes and experimental tasks (BART, “Balloon
Analog Risk Task” or Roger’s Risk Task) (Rogers et al., 1999).
In this study, we used tDCS to study the neural basis of loss
aversion. By applying different polarities of tDCS over the right or
left prefrontal cortex, we studied whether unilateral stimulation
could change the participants’ responses to risky decision making
in the face of gains or losses. We designed a simpler and clearer
risk measurement table (Multiple Price List, MPL) based on a
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previous study, which reflected the participants’ degree of loss
aversion in the risky decision making based on the crossover
point (CP) in the frames of both gains and losses (Holt and Laury,
2002). According to the previous study, which used a risk task
based on the design by (Holt and Laury, 2002; Ye et al., 2015a), we
hypothesized that the DLPFC is responsible for risky decisions,
and, furthermore, the right and left DLPFC areas play different
roles in this process; the left DLPFC is sensitive to gains, whereas
the right DLPFC is sensitive to losses.
The results of our experiment show that the tendencies of
the participants are to be more risk averse in the gain frame
after receiving left anodal tDCS and more risk-seeking in the loss
frame after receiving right cathodal tDCS. The behavioral result
is consistent with the loss aversion phenomenon in prospect
theory. Our hypothesis that the process of risky decision making
is correlated with the interaction of multiple systems in the brain
can be partly confirmed (Rick, 2010). Our findings suggest that
the left hemisphere is responsible for the evaluation in the gain
frame, whereas the right hemisphere takes charge in the loss
frame, which leads to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains
and risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. This asymmetric
effect improves our understanding of the different roles that the
different regions of the DLPFC play in the process of decision
making under risk, and it extends our knowledge of the left
DLPFC’s function when facing gains and losses. In particular, our
conclusion provides partial neural evidence and creates a useful
paradigm to help us to better understand loss aversion in the
framework of prospect theory.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
We recruited a total of 150 healthy students (82 females; mean age
21.3 years, ranging from 18 to 28 years) of Zhejiang University
as the participants in our experiment. All participants met the
following conditions: they were right-handed, naive to both tDCS
and risk tasks, had no history of clinical impairments, psychiatric
illness or neurological disorders. The participants were randomly
assigned to the sham treatment (n = 30, 15 females) or to one
of the four active treatments: left anodal tDCS (n = 30, 16
females), left cathodal tDCS (n = 30, 17 females), right anodal
tDCS (n = 30, 20 females) and right cathodal tDCS (n = 30, 14
females). The participants received a fixed show-up fee of 30 RMB
yuan (∼4.40 US dollars) plus the gain and loss from the task.
On average, they received 32.34 RMB yuan (∼4.76 US dollars)
from the task, ranging from 9 to 51 RMB yuan according to
their performance and the computer program. The experiment
was approved by the Zhejiang University ethics committee. The
participants were asked to give written informed consent before
starting the experiment. Some participants reported a slight itch
during the stimulation, but none reported any adverse side effects
involving pain on the scalp or headaches.
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation
Transcranial direct current stimulation applied weak but
constant direct current over the scalp via two saline-soaked
sponge electrodes (35 cm2). The constant current was delivered
by a battery-driven stimulator (Multichannel, non-invasive
wireless tDCS neurostimulator, Starlab, Barcelona, Spain), which
was controlled by a Bluetooth system. The purpose of the tDCS
was to induce cortical excitability of the target area without
causing any physiological damage to the human body. Different
orientations of the current have different effects on cortical
excitability. In general, the anodal stimulation enhances cortical
excitability and cathodal stimulation decreases the cortical
excitability (Nitsche and Paulus, 2000).
We chose the right F4/left F3 and Pz to place the electrodes,
according to the international EEG 10–20 system (Figure 1).
We stimulated the unilateral DLPFC instead of the DLPFC
bilaterally because we aimed to distinguish the impact of the
right or left DLPFC from the effects of changing the balance of
activity across both DLPFCs. The parietal cortex was chosen to
construct the current circuit together with the DLPFC because
of its reasonable spatial and functional distance from our target
region, which decreased the possibility of stimulation interaction
or task interference (Simon et al., 2002).
Participants assigning to different treatments received
different stimulations. For right anodal stimulation, the
anodal electrode was placed over F4, while the cathodal
electrode was placed over Pz. For left anodal stimulation,
the anodal electrode was placed over F3, and the cathodal
electrode was also placed over Pz. For right cathodal and left
cathodal stimulation, the placements were reversed. The anodal
electrode was placed over Pz, and the cathodal electrode was
placed over F4 or F3 (Figure 2). For sham stimulation, the
same procedures were applied, but the current lasted only
for the first 30 s. This brief duration of stimulation could
hardly modulate cortical excitability, but the participants may
have felt the initial itching and believed they were receiving
stimulation. This kind of sham stimulation has been proved
to be reliable (Gandiga et al., 2006). The constant current
was 2 mA in intensity, with 15 s of ramp up and down,
which has been shown to be safe and effective by previous
studies.
For stimulation, the laboratory assistant first put the tDCS
electrodes filled with conductive gel on a participant’s head and
told him/her to rest on a sofa to stay calm. After 15 min of
stimulation, the participant was asked to sit in front of a computer
to do the task. After he/she finished the risky decision making
task, the tDCS device was removed from the participant’s head.
Task and Procedure
We designed an MPL, which was consisted of 10 choices
(Table 1), to measure the degree of the participants’ risk aversion
much simpler and clearer. Each choice has two different options,
and in each option there are two realizations (A1 and A2
or B1 and B2) with different probabilities over the 10 rows.
Option A is safer (the “safe” option) compared with option
B (the “risky” option) in the same choice. Participants had
to choose between the two options over the 10 rows in the
two frames of gain and loss. After finishing the task, the
computer randomly chose a row in each frame and decided
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic and locations of the electrode positions. Schematic of the electrode positions based on the EEG 10–20 system (A) and locations of the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the parietal cortex of the human brain (B).
the participant’s gain and loss according to the probabilities
and the options he/she chose. For example, if the computer
randomly chose row 3 in the gain frame, then the participant
could gain 12 yuan (23 yuan) with a probability of 30% or gain
10 yuan (2 yuan) with a probability of 70% given he/she chose
option A (option B). Similarly, if the computer randomly chose
row 10 in the loss frame, then the participant would lose 12
yuan (23 yuan) with a probability of 100% given he/she chose
option A (option B). Both gain and loss were included in the
final payoff, encouraging the participants to earn as much as
possible. The experiment was between-subject design to avoid
the participants’ tendency of anchoring on the previous decision
makings.
We used the experimental software z-Tree to present the
two MPLs in the frames of gains and losses as well as to
automatically calculate the final payoff (Fischbacher, 2007).
Before the task, participants had to pass a control question
test to ensure that they fully understood how their profit
was decided. After the participants finished the task, they
were asked to complete a questionnaire before they finally
received their payment (Figure 3). The questionnaire contained
questions about personal information, such as gender, age,
income, consumption expenditure and self-assessment of risk
preference.
Data Analysis
In the first row of the gain frame, most participants, except
extreme risk-takers, will choose option A because the expected
value of option A is much higher than that of option B (10.2
yuan versus 4.1 yuan). In contrast, in the last row of the gain
frame, all rational participants will choose option B because it
provides a higher certain benefit. The expected value gap between
option A and option B decreases from positive to negative as the
row number increases. As a result, there will be one and only
one CP for a rational participant with a consistent preference
(Viscusi and Chesson, 1999; Holt and Laury, 2002). Option A
is chosen before the CP and option B is chosen at or after
the CP (extreme risk takers may choose option B in each row,
thus the CP is set to 1). For example, if a participant chose
option A in rows 1–6 and then chose option B in rows 7–
10, then his/her CP was 7. The loss frame is in the same way.
Most participants will choose option B in the first row and will
choose option A in the last row in the loss frame. Then, option
B is chosen before the CP, and option A is chosen at or after
the CP. For the gain frame, the participant displayed a higher
degree of risk aversion if he/she had a larger CP. In contrast, for
the loss frame, the participant displayed a higher degree of risk
aversion if he/she had a smaller CP. Therefore, the CP can be
regarded as an index for depicting the participant’s degree of risk
aversion.
We applied a mixed ANOVA using frame (gain vs. loss) as
a within-subject factor and the treatment (right anodal, right
cathodal, left anodal, left cathodal vs. sham) as a between-subject
factor to detect the interaction effects in each condition. Then
we conducted a one-way ANOVA to compare the participants’
CPs across the five treatments in the frame of gain as well as
in the frame of loss. If the CPs of the four active treatments
were significantly different from those of the sham treatment,
we could speculate that the stimulation had changed the
participants’ degree of risk attitude. Finally, we used a linear
mixed effect model to estimate the possible impact of the
treatment effects. The post hoc analyses were conducted using
the Tukey HSD correction, and the critical level of significance
was set at p < 0.05. All the statistical analyses were performed
using SPSS software (version 20.0, SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL,
USA).
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FIGURE 2 | The stimulation modes of the four active treatments. The axis of this electronic potential diagram represents the input voltage of tDCS device,
ranging from −18.476 V to 14.463 V. The deeper color represents the higher voltage and stronger current.
TABLE 1 | Multiple price list.
Row No. Option A Option B
A1 = 12
Probability
A2 = 10
Probability
B1 = 23
Probability
B2 = 2
Probability
1 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9
2 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8
3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.7
4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6
5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
6 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4
7 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.3
8 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2
9 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1
10 1 0 1 0
RESULTS
We first applied a mixed ANOVA using frame (gain vs. loss)
as a within-subject factor and the type of tDCS (right anodal,
right cathodal, left anodal, left cathodal vs. sham) as a between-
subject factor. The 2 (frame) × 5 (treatment) mixed-model
ANOVA revealed that the main effect for frame was significant
(F1,145 = 53.22, p < 0.001), indicating that the CP was
significantly larger in the gain frame (mean = 5.900) than that
in the loss frame (mean = 4.853, p < 0.001). The estimated
marginal means are shown in Figure 4. A significant main effect
for treatment was also observed (F4,145 = 2.907, p = 0.024).
Crucially, significant interaction effects of frame by treatment
were observed (F4,145 = 2.670, p= 0.035).
Based on the results of the omnibus ANOVA above, we could
focus on the specific analysis to reveal the effects of tDCS on risky
choices. Simple effect analyses revealed a significant difference
in the participants’ CPs in the gain frame and a marginal
significant difference in the loss frame (one-way ANOVA; gain,
F4,145 = 3.009, p = 0.020; loss, F4,145 = 2.348, p = 0.057).
Post hoc analyses indicated that in the gain frame, the CPs
of the participants receiving left anodal tDCS (mean = 6.60)
were significantly larger than those of the participants receiving
sham treatment (mean = 5.53, Tukey HSD, p = 0.019). In the
loss frame, the CPs of the participants receiving right cathodal
tDCS (mean = 5.23) were significantly larger than those of
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FIGURE 3 | Schematic representation of the experimental design.
FIGURE 4 | The estimated marginal means of crossover points in both
frames.
the participants receiving sham treatment (mean = 4.50, Tukey
HSD, p = 0.037). No significant differences were found for
the other active treatments compared to the sham group. This
result indicates that the participants tended to be more risk-
averse in the gain frame after receiving left anodal tDCS and
tended to be more risk-seeking in the loss frame after receiving
right cathodal tDCS. The CPs of the participants are shown in
Figure 5.
The reaction time (RT) was also analyzed by applying a mixed-
design ANOVA. Neither frame nor treatment had any significant
effect on RT, which indicates that the RTs in each condition
showed no significant difference. The mean RT and standard
deviation are displayed in Table 2.
Finally, we applied a linear mixed-effect model with five
dummy variables (four treatments and frame) and personal
information as independent variables, with the CP as the
dependent variable. The five dummy variables and the interaction
FIGURE 5 | The crossover points in the gain frame (A) and the loss frame
(B). The error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The asterisks indicate
statistical significance of differences between treatments.
of frame and treatment entered the model as the fixed effects,
whereas the personal information like age and self-assessment
risk as the random effects. The dummy variable R+ was equal
to 1 if the participant received right anodal tDCS and was equal
to 0 if the participant received the other treatments. Similarly,
R-, L+ and L- were equal to 1 if the participant received right
cathodal, left anodal and left cathodal tDCS, respectively. The
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TABLE 2 | The crossover point (CP) and reaction time (RT) of the
participants.
CP (Mean ± SD) RT (Mean ± SD, second)
Gain R+ 5.70 ± 1.21 84.67 ± 22.63
R− 5.70 ± 1.18 86.03 ± 18.54
L+ 6.60 ± 1.35 90.13 ± 21.72
L− 5.97 ± 1.47 81.83 ± 16.24
S 5.53 ± 1.41 81.97 ± 9.60
Loss R+ 5.00 ± 0.79 85.47 ± 29.96
R− 5.23 ± 1.04 87.03 ± 24.87
L+ 4.77 ± 1.17 88.77 ± 21.37
L− 4.77 ± 0.86 74.37 ± 26.26
S 4.50 ± 1.04 80.06 ± 14.41
dummy variable frame was equal to 1 if the participants facing
gains, otherwise equal to 0. The coefficients and significance of
the linear mixed-effect model are shown in Table 3. We can
see that the frame has a significant impact to the participants’
degree of CP, which is consistent with the behavioral data.
The significant coefficient of R- reveals that the right cathodal
stimulation over right DLPFC may change the participants’ risky
attitude. The interaction of frame and L+ also showed a marginal
significance, which indicates that the influence of L+ stimulation
was significant in the gain frame. The coefficients of personal
information showed no significance.
DISCUSSION
Loss aversion exists in our daily life as an anomaly. For example,
the return on equity is higher than the return on bonds,
and consumers are far more sensitive to price increases than
decreases. These phenomena or anomalies represent systemic
deviations from classical economic theory, especially the basic
hypothesis of the rational man in economics (Camerer et al.,
1997; Camerer, 1998; Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004; Wilkinson
and Klaes, 2012).
TABLE 3 | The coefficients and significance of linear mixed-effect models.
Parameter Estimate SE t
Frame 1.033∗∗∗ 0.302 3.417
R+ 0.488 0.305 1.468
R− 0.666∗∗ 0.306 2.174
L+ 0.201 0.306 0.657
L− 0.259 0.302 0.855
Frame∗R+ −0.333 0.428 −0.779
Frame∗R− −0.567 0.428 −1.325
Frame∗L+ 0.800∗ 0.428 1.871
Frame∗L− 0.167 0.428 0.390
Age −0.041 0.038 −1.093
Self-assessment of risk attitude −0.072 0.082 −0.879
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1.
In addition to the mathematical proof, the psychological
evidence for loss aversion has remained poorly understood.
Some researchers have suggested that loss aversion appears to be
moderated by affect (Trepel et al., 2005). Dhar and Wertenbroch
(2000) reported that loss aversion was more pronounced for
“hedonic goods” than “utilitarian goods”; the affective richness
of consumption goods seemed to enhance differences in the
perceived value of gaining versus losing these items.
Neuroimaging studies have indicated that loss aversion, as
revealed by a risk-attitude measurement, has a neural basis
involving the amygdala, orbital gyrus, and striatum or the
interactional function between them (Knutson et al., 2001;
Fukunaga et al., 2012; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2012; Krawczyk and
D’Esposito, 2013). However, the prefrontal cortex is considered
to be an important area for the emotional cognitive process
of humans, which is inevitable to study its function during
risky decision making. The prefrontal cortex is a large and
heterogeneous brain region, and it appears that different regions
may play different roles in decision making. Our tDCS study
focused on the left/right DLPFC and applied a numerical task
to observe the risk attitude of the participants. Our results
showed that the left and right brain regions exhibit asymmetric
functions in human loss aversion, especially in the gain and
loss frames. To be specific, the participants became more risk
averse in the gain frame when the excitability of their left
DLPFC was enhanced by anodal tDCS stimulation, whereas the
participants showed riskier patterns in the loss frame when the
excitability of their right DLPFC was inhibited by cathodal tDCS.
Concerning the hotly debated topic of whether loss aversion is
a byproduct of a single system or results from the interaction
of multiple systems in the brain, the results of our experiment
add further evidence in support of the latter hypothesis, at
least in the DLPFC. Our findings also support the reliability of
neuroimaging results across different research groups (Cazzell
et al., 2012; Bembich et al., 2014; Holper et al., 2014; Lin et al.,
2014).
To further interpret the mechanism of risky decision making,
we should pay attention to the emotional factors. Previous
studies have shown that a risky decision process is generally
associated with emotions. Specifically, the emotional processing
occurred before the decision processing (Mohr et al., 2010;
Martin and Delgado, 2011). tDCS has also been proven to
be able to influence the emotional processing. For example,
Peña-Gómez et al. (2011) demonstrated that tDCS over the
DLPFC could change the perceived degree of the emotional
valence for negative stimuli; Boggio et al. (2009) suggested
that tDCS was effective in modulating the emotional process
of pain. More recently, Engelmann et al. (2015) observed a
disruption of neural valuation in risky decision processing caused
by the anticipatory anxiety, revealing the neural mechanism
of incidental anxiety on human risky decision making. Cohn
et al. (2015) recruited financial professionals in different financial
scenarios (boom or bust) to find that subjects were more
fearful and more risk averse in the bust than in the boom
condition, suggesting that fear may play an important role in
countercyclical risk aversion. The close relationship between
emotion and risky decision making has also been theoretically
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demonstrated by Phelps and her partners (Phelps et al., 2014).
All of these studies strengthen the evidence linking risky decision
making and the asymmetric mechanism that was found in our
experiment.
Combined with previous neuroimaging and brain stimulation
studies, the asymmetric effect observed in our experiment may
further provide a new perspective on the phenomenon of loss
aversion. As we know, the prefrontal cortex is often thought
to be the primary site for cognitive regulation of emotion
(Davidson et al., 2000), especially the right and left DLPFC, which
play a variety of roles in different cognitive processes. Previous
studies have provided numerous pieces of evidence that the
right DLPFC is related to negative emotions such as depression,
anxiety, fear and so on. Carlsson et al. (2004) demonstrated
that the right DLPFC and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex were
less activated by feared stimuli than to fear-relevant but non-
feared stimuli. Shackman et al. (2009) showed that activation of
the right DLPFC was related to behavioral inhibition. On the
other hand, psychologists and economists have already suggested
that negative emotions such as fear and anxiety could influence
the sensitivity degree to losses (Camerer, 2005; Xu et al., 2009),
which was consistent with our finding. In our experiment, the
participants tended to be more risk-seeking after the cathodal
stimulation over the right DLPFC, which may suggest that the
right DLPFC is a loss-sensitive area that is more activated when
making decisions about potential losses.
The left hemisphere is well known for its functions of logical
analysis and rational calculation (McElroy and Seta, 2004). There
have been few studies to demonstrate the relationship between
the left DLPFC and decision making. However, some evidence
has still shown that the left DLPFC region participates in the
rewarding process associated with the dopamine (DA) system
(Peciña et al., 2013). Combined with our previous results, we may
speculate that the left DLPFC is a gain-sensitive area. When its
cortical excitability was enhanced by anodal tDCS stimulation,
the performance of our participants became more risk averse. In
a word, the asymmetric mechanism of the right/left DLPFC can
help us to better interpret the phenomenon of loss aversion.
The current method of unilateral DLPFC stimulation in our
experiment provides a much more precise measurement of
loss aversion, which may explain the differences between our
results and other observations, and the method may help us
to better understand the neural basis of loss aversion. Sellaro
et al. (2015) showed that using an irrelevant brain region
as a return electrode was possible; therefore, we placed the
return electrode on Pz, for which there is no evidence that
it is related to economic decision making. Unlike previous
tDCS studies, we excluded the effect of tDCS attributed to the
interaction results from modulating the excitability of bilateral
brain regions and only showed the effect of a specific unilateral
neural area. We distinguished between the effect of unilateral
DLPFC stimulation and that of changing the activity across both
DLPFCs. Our results reveal both a hemispheric asymmetry and a
frame-dependent asymmetry in the performance of participants
and suggest that the left hemisphere is responsible for the
evaluation in the gain frame, whereas the right hemisphere
takes charge in the loss frame. That is, when compared with
the left DLPFC, the right DLPFC might be more sensitive
to the change in monetary stimulation. This finding may
help us to understand why the shape of the value function
is concave for the quadrant of gains but convex for the
quadrant for losses (Fox and Poldrack, 2008; Schonberg et al.,
2011).
On the other hand, previous tDCS studies have measured
risk attitudes using various tasks, and different results have
been observed. We applied the MPL based on CPs originally
designed by Holt and Laury (2002) to measure the risk attitudes
of our participants. By using the original MPL design, we
offered a simpler and clearer task table for the participants
and reduced the possibility of switching back and forth from
choice A to B more than once, which is inevitable in random-
order designs. This strategy avoided potential inconsistencies in
preferences, which is an important standard for rational decisions
(Viscusi and Chesson, 1999). Because the MPL design has been
popular in economic experiments to induce the utility function
of risk attitudes, it is much more convenient to compare our
experimental results with those of similar experiments.
A limitation of the current study was that we applied a
between-subject design to avoid a potential learning effect in
our experiment. Such a between-subject design may result in
heterogeneity and diminished power of the data analysis. On
the other hand, the decision making of the participants in the
experiment relied on the expected value, and we still cannot
evaluate the risk attitude precisely to model loss aversion. Future
studies may focus on solving the trade-off between heterogeneity
and the learning effect through more refined experimental
designs, such as the BART or Roger’s task. Unlike the MPL task,
these kinds of risky attitude measurements may have a more
intuitive feeling for the participants. The frames of gains and
losses in the current experiment were not counterbalanced, which
might cause order effects. In addition, different brain regions,
such as the striatum and the amygdala, can also be considered
to help us explore the process of decision making better in the
future.
CONCLUSION
The current study explained why the majority of decision making
tends toward risk aversion when facing choices that involve sure
gains and risk seeking when facing choices that involve sure
losses, and it also revealed both a hemispheric asymmetry and a
frame-dependent asymmetry in the performance of participants
confronting risk decisions. Our results provide further neural
evidence for the loss aversion pattern and offer solid support
for the reliability of neural imaging results in neuroscience.
Both the MPL design using frames of gains and losses and the
unilateral tDCS stimulation in our experiment provide much
more precise measurements of risk attitude, demonstrating the
particular functions of certain neural regions in human risky
decision making. Although the study of decision making using
cognitive neuroscience techniques is relatively young, a growing
body of evidence suggests that decision making under risk
is mediated by a network of cortical and limbic structures.
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Our experiment reveals that loss aversion has a controllable,
reproducible and verifiable causal relationship with specific
neural systems, providing further evidence for the understanding
of prospect theory.
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